The literature on agency costs has established that the introduction of outside equity results in conflicts betl.een ne1,7 mmers and management that lO1,7ers the value of the firm. In contrast, this paper, by focusing on management-labor conflicts, demonstrates that the value of the firm can be increased by the introduction of outside equity. We obtain this result by sho1,7ing that the bargaining position of the o1,7ner-manager is enhanced 1,7hen outside equity is increased. As a result, 1,7orkers with firm-specific skills are persuaded to accept a lm.er 1,7age, and hence the value of the firm increases.
! (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 312 ). Jensen and Yeckling concentrated on the principal-agent problem and the agency costs that arise from the introduction of outside equity into the firm. This Has done without any consideration of I~hat effects such an action might have had on the bargaining power of the OImer-manager III negot iating I~ages I~i th the current employees of the firm.
Several years later ~Iasahiko Aoki (1980; 1984, Chapter 5) introduced a model of the firm that emphasized flits aspect as a quasi-permanent organization of stockholders and employees ll (1980, p. 600) . He asserted that as a result of the association Hith the firm, the employees acquire skills and knoHledge that, I.hen combined I~i th the physical assets supplied by the stockholders, can produce some economic gains --the so-called organizational rent. Such rents would not be possible through the employment of external factors of production (such as workers that have no knowledge of the workings of the firm). The organizational rent can be produced only through the cooperation of the stockholders (supplying the physical assets) and the existing employees. As such, the situation is tantamount to a tHo-person cooperative game, and the question becomes, hOH then is the organizational rent to be distributed betl~een stockholders and employees.
Aoki proposed that the solution to this particular distribution problem could be accomplished by use of a bargaining process attributed to Frederik Zeuthen and John Harsanyi that leads to the Nash bargaining solution.
Implicit In Aoki's analysis was that all equity was outside equity. Therefore, no attent ion was given to how alternat i ve OImership structures of the firm affect (1) the bargaining po\.er of the manager and (2) the distribution of the organizational rent. One could start out with an owner-managed firm and examine the distribution of the organizational rent under such an o\.nership structure. It \wuld then be important to understand hOI. the introduct ion of outside equity into the f irm ~ la Jensen and ~Ieclding, \wuld affect, if at all, the distribution of the organizational rent.
This paper demonstrates that the introduction of outside equity into a heretofore o\.ner-managed firm increases the bargaining power of a risk averse o\mer-manager. As a result, the employees' share in the organizational rent will decrease, \.hich will in turn lead to an increase in the value of the firm.
Section II of this paper introduces a simple model of the firm that makes possible the explicit derivation of the organizational rent from the existing market conditions. In addition, Section II sets the stage for the bargaining process that determines the distribution of the organizational rent bet\.een stockholders and skilled workers. This process takes the form of negotiations for the determination of a wage rate for skilled workers (and, therefore, the capitalized value of the firm).
The bargaining process itself, and the conditions for reaching an equilibrium, are described in Section III. Thereafter in Section IV, we conclude \.ith an examination of the introduction of outside equity, its effects on the manager r S bargaining pOl.er and, through that, its effects on the equilibrium of the bargaining process and the value of the firm.
An Appendix contains the more technical derivations and mathematical proofs.
II. The Model
'{e consider a firm that at period t, given the price per unit of output, Pt' announced at the end of last period, faces a set of outstanding orders representing a quantity qt for its product. The manager must decide on the quantity to produce, q (q ~ qt) at the given price. For purposes of simplicity, I;e assume al;ay the possibility of negative inventories (i. e., backlogging) or positive inventories, so that unfilled orders represent lost sales. l
To introduce the concept of what Aoki (1980) refers to as organizational rent, \;e assume that, given the existing amount of capital, the employment of outside workers without firm-specific skills and knOl;ledge, at a market wage rate w ' enables the firm to fill outstanding orders representing the quantity o qo' qo < qt' of its product. Given a discount rate r, let yO represent the capitalized value of the firm under this policy (\~here yO > 0).
Workers, through their association with the firm for at least one period, acquire firm-specific skills so that their retention by the firm, augmented by the possible addition of unskilled workers, will enable the firm to fill the entire set of outstanding orders, i.e., produce and sell qt.
Let C(qt; \~ 0) and C(qo; w0) be the costs to the firm for produc ing quant it ies qt and qo' respect i vely, assuming the skilled and unskilled Iwrkers are paid the same I~age rate wo' Then, represents the organizational rent that would result from the cooperation of skilled workers with the firm in time period t. It is further assumed that lIn a bargaining model the possibility of positive or negative inventories may alter the bargaining power of management and labor. This is not considered here. 7 t > O. The skills of workers with at least one time period's experience with the firm are firm-specific; they cannot be used outside the firm. Therefore, if they seek alternative employment these workers will not be able to earn more than the market \~age rate \~o. As suggested in the introduction, this implies that the model is equivalent to a t\~o-person cooperative game and the question is hO\~ 7 will be distributed between skilled \wrkers and the stockholders of t the firm.
To explore this question, let us suppose that the part of lit gOIng to skilled workers will be determined by the wage rate w t that these workers negotiate at the beginning of each period t I~i th the management of the firm.
That is, w = W + u \~here u~ o and u represents that portion of the wage t o t t t rate received by skilled workers that emanates from the organizational ren t. As a consequence, given \~o and the discount rate r: the capitalized value of the firm can be expressed as a function of w t ' ,~ith V(I~O) representing its ma'CImum value, i.e., where the entire organizational rent lit goes to the stockholders of the firm.
Alternatively, V(w + ~t/Nt-l) represents the firm1s mInImum value, i.e., o when the entire organizational rent ~t goes to the skilled workers of the firm: that is, the N -1 I{orkers employed at period t-l. V(w ) is a linear function of t t w t ' with VI (w t ) < 0. 2 Therefore the capitalized value of the firm can be represented as in Figure 1 . 2For given r, if the firm receives a fraction 8 of "t and skilled workers receive a fraction (1-8) of ~t' then V(w t ) = V(w ) + 8"t/(1 + r),
Bargaining Possibilities Frontier
The curve V(\\) represents the "bargaining possibilities frontier" \vhere skilled
Horkers prefer points close to the \v't-a.,'(is Hhile stockholders prefer points close to the V-a.'(is .
III. The Bargaining Process
In the negotiation process for the determination of the Hage rate H (and, t therefore, the value of the firm V(\~t))' \"e assume that the "typical" skilled \wrker is guided by a von Neumann-~Iorgenstern utility indicator U L I~i th \~age rate \~t as its sole argument, and \~e assume that
Like\~ise, the manager of the firm is guided in the negotiation process by a von Neumann-Jlorgenstern utility indicator U M Ivith \~ealth V as its sole argument.
In particular, \~e assume that the manager mms a fraction {i, 0 < {i ~ 1 of the firm, and that h~ holds financial assets in the amount of 1{F dollars, 1{F f O.
Therefore, for a given \~age rate for skilled Ivorkers I~t, 1{ = 11' F + (l'V(\~t)' and 6 Differentiating (2) \{ith respect to \{t \;e obtain 1{e assume that U~r(1{) > 0, U~i('{) < 0, and Uir'l ~ 0.
We are now in a position to investigate the bargaining process which can yield a unique V and w. The process described is largely attributable to
Zeuthen. Harsanyi has demonstrated that the Zeuthen solution to the bargaining problem is the Nash bargaining solution. The description of the process closely follows that given by Aoki.
1{ages of skilled workers are determined at the beginning of each period by a bargaining process. The parties to the bargaining process are management and a representative skilled employee (Aoki, 1980, p. 604) . At the beginning of the period each side must decide to acquiesce or bargain for a concession from the other side. If bargaining is undertaken each side understands that the other side may exercise its threat to withhold cooperation. 3
The basis for negotiations is a wage rate \;t proposed by the manager, \;here W~ w < W + r /N _ 1 . Let w;_l be the wage rate that skilled workers were o t o t t paid at period t-1. Then, the wage rate proposed by the manager, w t ' could be less than w * -If so, the manager is essentially asking for a concession from t 1 ' the skilled workers. Alternatively he could propose a wage equal to w * -the t 1 ' wage paid skilled workers in t-l.
The skilled workers have two strategies. One consists of (a) accepting the 1~age rate w t proposed by the manager; the other (b) rejecting w t and asking for an increase equal to h. With respect to the latter case, the manager has two strategy options. First, the manager can accept the workers' demand for an increase In w t by h, in which case the wage rate of skilled workers for period t 1~ill be 1~t + hand, as a result, the capitalized value of the firm ,.;ill be V = -*
Alternatively, the manager can reject the workers I demand for an increase in w t by h. In this latter case, depending upon the workers' response, there are two possible outcomes. (a) The skilled workers can wi thdra1~ the ir demand. Then, the IVage rat e remains at 1~ t and the value of * the firm is V(w t ) = Y ; or (b) the skilled workers can insist on their demand resulting in either the IVorker or management withdrawing their cooperation. In this latter case, the wage rate that skilled ,;orkers can earn by seeking alternative employment will be 1~0 and the value of the firm 1~ill fall to yO, as the firm has to employ unskilled workers.
If skilled workers m~~imize expected utility, they 1~ill enter negotiations, i.e., they will ask for a raise equal to h if their expected gain in utility is greater than their expected loss. More formally where Pl is labor's assessment of the probability that management 1~ill reject labor's demand and exercise its threat to withhold cooperation thereby resulting 8 1n a \,age of \'0. By rearranging terms, it follows that labor will go ahead Kith its demand for an increase in the wage rate by an increment equal to h if and only if:
In (5), P1 * represents the m~ximum risk (m~ximum probability of conflict) that skilled workers are prepared to face in order to achieve the \.age increment h.
In a similar manner, the manager will follow the second of the above t\.o strategies, i.e., he will reject the skilled workers' demand for an increase 1n the wage rate by h, if and only if, his expected gain is greater than his expected loss. More formally \.here P2 is the manager's assessment of the probability that skilled \wrkers will insist on their demand after such a demand has been rejected by the manager. Rearranging terms, (6) is equivalent to
In (7), P2 1S the maximum risk of conflict that management can tolerate before accepting the workers' demand for an increase in w t by h.
* the \.age increment, to arrive at the m~ximum Dividing P1(\'t' h) by h, probability per h of conflict, and letting h approach zero, \.e arrive at LB t , a 9 commonly used measure of bargaining power consistent with Aokils measure of the employees' bargaining power. LB, at time t:
In a like manner, dividing P2(w t , h; a) by h, as h approaches zero the measure of management I s bargaining pOl,7er, 11m, at time t is: (9) Following Zeuthen, we l,7ill assume that labor and management have an accurate assessment of each others' resolve to bear the risk of conflict and that each party will make a concession l,7hen he finds that his opponent is prepared to bear a greater risk of conflict. 4 Under our assumptions regarding strictly concave utility functions, it is clear that LB t is a decreasing function of l,7t Hhile ilm t is an increasing function of w t · Graphically the situation is represented as follows:
~Zeuthen's behavioral assumption is formally derived In Harsanyi: p. 149-151. Labor's and Management I s Bargaining POl~er Curves
FIGURE 2
If the manager proposes a \Vage rate smaller than IV * t , such as wi:, in the above diagram, LBt(wt,) > MBt(wi:,) and therefore skilled workers are prepared to bear a greater risk of conflict than management. In this case management concedes to labor I s demand for a higher \Vage rate. In a similar manner if skilled Iwrkers * rej ect the manager's proposal and demand a wage rate that is above I~t, such as \ V t , ~IBt (I~t) > LB t (I~t)' then management is prepared to bear a greater risk of conflict than skilled IVorkers. In this case the manager will reject the skilled lyorkers' demand for a higher IVage rate. It is only at a IVage rate IV = w * that t t the resolve of each party to bear risk is equalized, i.e., MBt(w * ) = LBt(w * ).
t t
We will refer to w * as the equilibrium wage rate of the bargaining process, t and it will determine a unique point on the bargaining possibilities frontier together with the respective capitalized value of the firm as established in Ivithout loss of generality we can assume that at the beginning of period t the owner-manager has no financial wealth, only firm-specific wealth, and further he owns 100% of the firm, i.e., a = 1. Therefore, any financial wealth that enters his utility function must corne from a sale of a portion E, o < E < 1, of the firm. With a representing the portion of the firm retained by the manager, a + E = 1.
Nmv, suppose that, faced with a demand by labor for an increase of the \.;age rate equal to h, the owner-manager considers selling a portion E of his interest in the firm to outsiders, thus, converting interest In the firm to financial assets. This conversion of interest in the firm to financial assets \.;ill involve some wealth costs that we assume to be a function of E and denote by C(E). I{e further assume that C(E) is continuous and t\.;ice differentiable for
It is intended that the function C(E) captures all \.;ealth costs that result from the transactions involved in converting interest in the firm to financial assets. In particular, \.;e assume that (a) the mmer-manager \.;ill be retained in his role as a manager under the new ownership structure of the firm at least for 6The conclusions of this section \.;ill not be altered if the manager initially owned less than 100% of the firm. the current period, and (b) acting in his o\{n best interests, his managerial tasks will include negotiating a wage rate with the skilled \.orkers. Therefore, in addition to any other costs, such as commissions paid to third parties and income t~xes on capital gains, it is intended that the cost function c(e) captures the agency costs considered by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . It will be reasonable, then, to assume that (11) c (0) = 0; c (e) > 0, for e > 0; c' (e) ~ 0 and c" (e) ~ 0. 7 Let V represent the market value of the firm at the beginning of period t, (a) before a wage rate for the skilled workers has been determined, and (b) exclusive of any wealth costs that are captured by the cost function c(·).
Then, the net receipts from the sale of a portion e of the firm and, therefore, the manager IS financial \{ealth at period t will be An implication of (12) is that, for 0 < e ~ 1, the mmer-manager's wealth ,~ can have one of three possible values. If the manager accepts the skilled workers' demand, (13a) q(e) = aV(w t
If the manager rejects the skilled workers I demand and the skilled \wrkers withdraw such a demand, 7According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 313) , the \{ealth costs to the owner-manager will be increasing as his fractional ownership falls. Among the reasons given are: (a) the incentive of the manager to appropriate larger amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites, (b) costs for monitoring his behavior, and (c) his declining incentive to devote significant effort to "creative activities. I' To these reasons \.e can add that the owner-manager's decision to sell part of his interest in the firm may signal that there is trouble in the negotiation process with the employees.
Finally, if the manager rejects the skilled workers' demand and negotiations break dmm, (13c) WO(E) = aVo + EV -C(E).
Since V is independent of the wage rate that will prevail for period t, so is W F . Therefore, with the proper substitutions of equations (13a) , (13b), and (13c) into (6), the derivation of the manager's bargaining power at time t, ~IBt' in (9) remains valid. However, with (12), 'vF was seen to be a function of E.
Utilizing (13b) and (13c) , \-le can \-lrite (14) As a preliminary to the general case, and in order to get an intuitive understanding of the process, let us suppose for a moment that there are no costs involved in selling a portion of the firm by the manager. In particular, let us suppose that Y = V(w t ). Then, from (13b) , W= Y(w t ), for any E, and from O (13c), W = aVo + EV(W t ). Substituting into (14) we obtain On the other hand, for a = 1, i.e., for E = 0,
In comparing the t~o, the case where a < 1, with the case where a = 1, it is easily seen (see Appendix [A.2J) that concavity of the utility function implies
which means that the manager I s bargaining pOl,Ter all,Tays increases as he substitutes OImership interest in the firm l,Tith financial l,Tealth.
,{ith Y = Y(w t ), and c(e) = 0, for all e, the manager would have nothing to lose by selling a portion of the firm. In fact, he could always guarantee himself a wealth level equal to Y(w t ) with certainty if he were to sell the entire firm. Therefore, l,Ti th free "insurance " in the event that negotiations break down, together with the assumption that he is retained to negotiate the l,age rate in his OIm best interest, the manager 1,0uld have nothing to lose by rejecting any demand for an increase in the wage rate. In particular, under the current assumptions of this preliminary case, the manager could impose any l,Tage rate, hO\,Tever low, as long as it exceeds the market wage rate w ' so that o skilled workers would prefer employment l,Tith the firm.
Let us proceed now to examine the more realistic case where there are costs involved In selling off a portion of the firm as l,Te have assumed in (11), c(e) > 0.
Note that, Wee) -WO(e) = a(Y(w t ) -yO). Therefore, multiplying both the numerator and the denominator of the right hand side of (14) by (Y(H t ) -yO), setting U~I('{(e)) = b(e), (UjIC'{(e)) -UjI(wo(e)))/C'~T(e) -,{o(e)) = B(e), and 've have established that as the olmer-manager tends to be a pure manager,
i.e., as E tends to 1, his bargaining po\,er will be greater than in the case where he retains ownership of the entire firm, i.e., for the case where E = O.
The question is whether we can obtain a similar result for intermediate cases of
Observe that, for E > 0, the wealth functions In (13b) and (13c) are differentiable. Therefore, for E > 0, (12), as E approaches 0, the proceeds from the sale approach °\. -hile costs approach ~. Hence, regardless of the outcome of negotiations, the manager's wealth is less than it ,{ould have been under no sale of equity. As a consequence, even though by Proposition 1, the manager I S bargaining pm,er is an increas ing funct ion of E: for E > 0, there may be a range of E such that ~IBt (E) stays belm, ~IB.t (0). This occurs because the manager's wealth is now lower due to the lump-sum cost c. 8 Clearly since lump sum costs lm,er the manager's bargaining pOl,er only when a sell-off makes the manager unambiguously worst off, it is safe to assume that such an outcome would be unlikely.
In the absence of lump-sum costs ~IBt(E) > ~IBt(O). More formally the following proposition is valid. 
In conjunction with Proposition 1, Proposition 3 implies that the manager's bargaining power increases as he sells a larger share of the firm and is always larger than when he retains full ownership.
Let's now turn our attention to the effects of a sell-off on the value of the firm. The propositions above establish that under general conditions a sell-off of the firm will, for any given I,age rate, increase the manager's bargaining pmver. This means that a sell-off I,ill shift the MB t curve (initially presented in Figure 2 ) towards the northwest as depicted in Figure 4 .
FIGURE 4
Recall from Section III ~ that the equilibrium l>1age is established at the l>1age which equal izes the manager I s and labor I s bargaining pmier. Hence the sell-off I>1hich shifts the MB curve northl>1est to MBi' results in a lowered t equilibrium wage of w * '. Stockholders no,~ capture a larger portion of the t organizational rent, and as a result the value of the firm increases.
v. Conclusions
In this paper we have demonstrated that the introduction of outside equity
In an ol>1ner-managed firm can increase its value. The introduction of outside equity, even at a cost, serves as insurance for the manager in the event that negotiations break dOl>1n. Since he no longer bears the entire cost, the OImer-manager is more willing to risk a breakdOlm in negotiations to achieve '~age concessions from skilled labor. Labor perceives this, and accepts a 10l~er
Our assumptions preclude the possibility that the ne,~ stockholders are the current employees of the firm. An interesting extension 1>10uld be to examine hOI>1 the results reported here are altered if labor purchases a portion of the firm.
But from (16) and (17) Define 6(E) = -,,r0, (E)/(,i' (E) -W OI (E)), so (l-6(E)) = ,if (E)/6{1 (E) W OI (E)). Then, 1/2 ~ 6(E) ~ 1, for each E. In particular, if WI (E) = 0, 6(E) = 1, while if WI (E) < 0, 6(E) ~ 1/2 (which follows from the conditions of Proposition 1). Substituting 6(E) and 1-6(E) for the corresponding terms In B' (E) yields NOI,T UiI(',r) is a convex function (i.e., U~I(1V) < 0, and U~II r (W) ~ 0).
Therefore
[U~r(I~(E)) + 1/2(Uir(li O (E)) -U~1(1{(E)))J (1{(E) -l{o(E)) ~ (l\l(l~i(E))
U (1{0 (E) ) ) . ill
That is, the area under the straight line that connects any two different points on the graph of Uir(V) is at least as great as the area under the graph between those points.
Dividing both sides of the above inequality by (W(E) -l{o(E)), a positive number for E < 1, we obtain ~ U~I(1{(E)) + 1/2(UiI(I{0(E)) -U~I(E))) ~ 
